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Value of Flexible Resources, Virtual Bidding, and
Self-Scheduling in Two-Settlement Electricity
Markets With Wind Generation – Part I
Jalal Kazempour, Member, IEEE, and Benjamin F. Hobbs, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—Part one of this two-part paper presents new models
for evaluating flexible resources in two-settlement electricity mar-
kets (day-ahead and real-time) with uncertain net loads (demand
minus wind). Physical resources include wind together with
fast- and slow-start demand response and thermal generators.
We also model financial participants (virtual bidders). Wind is
stochastic, represented by a set of scenarios. The two-settlement
system is modeled as a two-stage process in which the first stage
involves unit commitment and tentative scheduling, while the
second stage adjusts flexible resources to resolve imbalances.
The value of various flexible resources is evaluated through
four two-settlement models: i) an equilibrium model in which
each player independently schedules its generation or purchases
to maximize expected profit; ii) a benchmark (expected system
cost minimization); iii) a sequential equilibrium model in which
the independent system operator (ISO) first optimizes against a
deterministic wind power forecast; and iv) an extended sequential
equilibrium model with self-scheduling by profit-maximizing
slow-start generators. A tight convexified unit commitment allows
for demonstration of certain equivalencies of the four models. We
show how virtual bidding enhances market performance, since,
together with self-scheduling by slow-start generators, it can help
a deterministic day-ahead market to choose the most efficient unit
commitment.
Index Terms– Operational flexibility, wind uncertainty, equilib-
rium, day-ahead, real-time, demand response, virtual bidding,
self-scheduling.
NOTATION
Indices:
d Index for loads
f Index for virtual bidders
i Index for generators
k Index for demand response blocks
n,m Indices for nodes
s Index for wind generation scenarios in real-time
market
t Index for hours
Sets:
F Set of fast-start dispatchable generators
FDR Set of fast demand response (DR) providers
S Set of slow-start dispatchable generators
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SS Set of slow-start dispatchable generators who self-
schedule
SDR Set of slow DR providers
W Set of wind power generators
Ωn Set of nodes connected to node n
Ψn Set of generators/loads/arbitragers located at node n
Constants:
φs Probability of scenario s
Bn,m Susceptance of transmission line connected node n
to node m [S]
Ci Production cost of dispatchable generator i [$/MWh]
CSUi Start-up cost of dispatchable generator i [$]
C↓d,k,t Downward DR provision cost of block k of load d
in hour t [$/MWh]
C↑d,k,t Upward DR provision utility of block k of load d in
hour t [$/MWh]
D↓d,k,t Maximum downward DR of block k of load d in
hour t [MW]
D↑d,k,t Maximum upward DR of block k of load d in hour
t [MW]
Ld,t Demand level of load d in hour t [MW]
P i Minimum power output of generator i [MW]
P i Capacity of dispatchable generator i [MW]
Fn,m Transmission capacity of line connected node n to
node m [MW]
RDi Ramp-down limit of generator i [MW/h]
RUi Ramp-up limit of generator i [MW/h]
WDAi,t Forecast in day-ahead market for production by wind
generator i ∈ W in hour t [MW]
WRTi,t,s Forecast in real-time market for production by wind
generator i ∈ W in hour t under scenario s [MW]
Primal variables (day-ahead market):
aDAn,m,t Power flow from node n to node m in hour t [MW]
cDAi,t Start-up cost of dispatchable generator i in hour t [$]
dDA↓d,k,t Downward DR of block k of load d in hour t [MW]
dDA↑d,k,t Upward DR of block k of load d in hour t [MW]
pDAi,t Power production of generator i in hour t [MW]
uDAi,t Relaxed commitment status of dispatchable generator
i in hour t
vDAf,t Trading quantity of virtual bidder f in hour t [MW]
θDAn,t Voltage angle of node n in hour t [rad]
Primal variables (real-time market):
aRTn,m,t,sPower transferred from node n to node m in hour t
under scenario s [MW]
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cRTi,t,s Start-up cost for fast-start dispatchable generator i ∈
F in hour t under scenario s [$]
dRT↓d,k,t,sDownward DR adjustment of block k of load d in
hour t under scenario s [MW]
dRT↑d,k,t,sUpward DR adjustment of block k of load d in hour
t under scenario s [MW]
pRTi,t,s Power production adjustment of generator i in hour
t under scenario s [MW]
uRTi,t,s Commitment status adjustment of fast-start dispatch-
able generator i ∈ F in hour t under scenario s
vRTf,t Trading quantity of virtual bidder f in hour t [MW]
θRTn,t,s Voltage angle of node n in hour t, scenario s [rad]
Dual variables:
λDAn,t Locational marginal price (LMP) in day-ahead mar-
ket at node n in hour t [$/MWh]
λRTn,t,s Probability-weighted LMP in real-time market at
node n in hour t under scenario s [$/MWh]
µ, ρ Set of dual variables in day-ahead and real-time
markets, respectively
I. INTRODUCTION
INSTALLED wind capacity in the US approached 75 GWby 2015, of which 53% was added since 2010 [1]. This
rapid penetration is due to cost improvements and supporting
environmental policies at the federal and state levels. How-
ever, uncertainty and variability in wind output pose serious
operational challenges in short-term, i.e., day-ahead (DA) and
real-time (RT), markets [2]. Specifically, the need to make DA
unit commitment (UC) decisions before net loads are known,
together with a lack of RT operational flexibility, can lead to
cost increases, volatile prices, and even violation of energy
balances.
In markets with significant wind power penetration, a major
concern is that a deterministic clearing of the DA market may
result in inefficient schedules and thereby increased expected
(probability weighted) system cost (or, more generally, re-
duced market surplus or “social welfare”, which equals the
value to consumers minus generation costs), relative to an
optimal stochastic schedule. Flexible resources can potentially
reduce the cost consequences of suboptimal DA schedules.
We consider three types of physical flexible resources in this
paper, including fast-start dispatchable generators (peaking
units), slow demand response (DR) providers (requiring DA
schedules), and fast DR providers (which are dispatchable in
RT). We also consider financial players in this paper. These
players take the form of virtual bidders or arbitragers who own
no physical assets and buy (sell) in the DA market and then
sell (buy) the same amount back in RT [3]-[6], as illustrated in
Fig. 1. In US electricity markets, e.g., CAISO and PJM, they
are allowed to trade through intertemporal energy arbitrage
between DA and RT. The bidding action of these arbitragers
is sometimes called “convergence bidding” (as in CAISO), as
these players usually help the DA and RT market prices to
converge in expectation [7]. Virtual bidding (VB) can occur
by buying (or selling) a fixed MWh quantity in a particular
interval of the day-ahead market at whatever market price
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Fig. 1. Virtual bidding (VB): The virtual bidder buys (sells) in the DA market
and then sells (buys) the same amount back in RT.
occurs, and then sell (buy) the same quantity back in the
corresponding intervals in RT. Or, more commonly, the virtual
bidder can submit a bid to up to a stated amount of MWh in
the DA market at a maximum given price (or offer to sell an
amount at a minimum price); then in the real-time market, the
virtual bidder zeroes out its position by selling (buying) back
the quantity of MWh that it bought (sold) DA. In general,
virtual bidders can enhance the markets ability to cope with
forecast errors by increasing liquidity and giving a means
for players to provide information to the market. Statistically
significant improvements in market efficiency have been found
in [7] and [8]. A PJM report in 2015 ([9], discussed in [10])
reviews the operation of virtual bidders in that energy market,
discusses their roles, and offers some recommendations.
In this paper, we are interested in answering two main
technical questions. First, how do we evaluate the economic
benefits of adding various types of flexible resources to man-
age forecast errors? Secondly, can physical flexible resources
and virtual bidders improve deterministic DA schedules?
More specifically, can VB alone make the deterministic DA
schedules fully efficient, i.e., identical to those obtained from
an ideal stochastic DA optimization model? If not, can the
DA schedules become fully efficient with VB combined with
slow-start dispatchable generators who self-schedule? These
power economics questions motivate the following method-
ological question: how can DA-RT markets with VB and self-
scheduling be simulated? To answer all of these questions,
a two-settlement setup including DA and RT markets is
considered. Then, we propose four different two-settlement
market-clearing equilibrium models that represent different
philosophies of market design (deterministic vs. stochastic
day-ahead; central market clearing vs. self-scheduling), and
subsequently explore their relationships.
It is common in the literature to simulate markets through
optimization models, taking advantage of the well-known
result that competitive markets without market failures can be
simulated by maximizing (expected) market surplus [11]. One
of our four models uses this approach to define an efficient
baseline for comparison with our other models. Optimization
models have often been used to explore the DA-RT price
convergence and other properties of two-settlement electricity
markets under uncertainty (see the survey in [12]). For in-
stance, a two-settlement electricity market-clearing mechanism
is proposed in [13] based on stochastic programming, and is
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proven to be revenue adequate for the independent system
operator (ISO) in each possible RT scenario. Reference [12]
extends that model, using penalties in the DA model to
produce DA prices and quantities equaling expected RT values.
Unlike our market models, neither considers the possible
arbitraging role of virtual bidders, nor do they consider unit
commitment decisions.
In contrast to the optimization approach, we instead directly
formulate most of our market problems as equilibrium models.
One reason is that we want to model the possibility of market
failures, in which market surplus is not maximized; we also
wish to incorporate VB which might contribute to the correc-
tion of market failures. Our two-settlement equilibrium models
consider trading by virtual bidders between the DA and RT
markets together with the ISO who clears those two markets
separately. Several papers in the literature use equilibrium
models to simulate two-settlement markets in power and other
sectors, but for different purposes than ours. For instance,
[14] proposes a stochastic two-settlement equilibrium model
to analyze the effects of policies that alter power market
incentives such as renewable subsidies. Market power was
also the focus of [15], which shows that competitiveness of
markets is improved by including one or more futures market;
they assume that virtual bidders ensure that DA and expected
prices are equal. Building on that work, [16] proposes a
two-settlement electricity market considering not only market
power but also flow congestion, demand uncertainty, and
system contingencies, and uses it to quantify the distorting
impacts of DA zonal pricing.
In the past, research on wind integration costs emphasized
the increased need for operating reserves [17]-[20] and trans-
mission [21]; changes in system costs as wind penetration
increases [22]-[25]; the quantification of the value of physical
flexible resources in wind-integrated markets [26]-[29]. In
contrast to our work, these papers do not represent two-
settlement markets that are financially arbitraged; as we will
show later, including VB can dramatically change solutions
and costs.
There is also work that addresses the impact of VB on two-
settlement markets with stochastic generation. Empirical work
in California indicates that VB has resulted in price conver-
gence between DA and RT, and improved efficiency [7], [8].
Meanwhile, reference [30] describes the circumstances under
which VB cannot improve market efficiency, and provides a
specific case study in California to illustrate these circum-
stances. Equilibrium-based models of markets have been used
to explore possible reasons for that outcome. For instance,
reference [31] points out different inefficiencies arising from
the German balancing market designs, and describes arbitrage
opportunities between the spot market and the balancing mech-
anism. Meanwhile, reference [32] considers a dispatch model
without UC constraints and investigates how VB reduces
merit-order inefficiency in a forward market. In particular, they
show that VB can potentially improve the conventional two-
stage market, except in those cases where the classical merit-
order dispatch needs to be violated. In the classical merit-order
dispatch, the ISO ranks the generators from the cheapest to
most expensive (in terms of variable cost), and then dispatches
them in that order. In practice, departures from merit-order
dispatch are required to meet other constraints at least-cost.
Examples of such constraints include transmission capacity,
ramping limits, and requirements for operating reserves. Our
result can be viewed as a generalization of [32] in which we
consider (i) UC constraints and costs as well as transmission,
which result in out-of-merit dispatch, as well as (ii) incentives
for and impacts of self-scheduling.
Considering the context above, the main contributions of
this two-part paper are as follows. We propose four distinct
two-settlement market-clearing models, including three equi-
librium models and one optimization problem. Within these
models, UC constraints are enforced through a tight convex
relaxation; its convexity allows for demonstration of certain
properties and equivalencies among the models that would
not be possible with discrete (binary) commitment models.
These four models allow the value of various flexible resources
to be quantified under different market assumptions. Another
motivation of this study is to ask whether the ISO and/or all
generators need to do stochastic unit commitment to achieve
the optimal solution (least expected system cost), or whether
virtual bidders in combination with stochastically-optimized
self-scheduling by a few slow-start resources alone are enough
to obtain it. This question is addressed by simulating VB and
self-scheduling of slow-start resources and their impacts on
DA schedules and costs within the equilibrium models.
The paper is organized as follows. In section II, we describe
the various market players as well as our modeling features
and assumptions. In section III, we compare the structure and
motivation of the four proposed two-settlement market models.
Section IV provides the mathematical formulations of the first
of the four models, which is the two-settlement equilibrium
model. Section IV concludes the paper. In the second part of
this two-part paper, we present the other three models, and
then apply all four models to a small test system and to the
24-node IEEE Reliability Test System to quantify the value of
flexible resources and the impact of VB and self-scheduling
on the efficiency of DA schedules.
II. MODEL ASSUMPTIONS AND GENERAL STRUCTURE
The following market players are considered in constructing
our equilibrium models of two-settlement markets: slow-start
and fast-start dispatchable generators; wind power facilities
with variable generation; slow and fast DR providers; arbi-
tragers (virtual bidders); the grid operator; and consumers
(loads). A slow-start dispatchable (thermal) generator makes
its commitment decisions in the DA market, while those
decisions are fixed in the RT market. In other words, it is
only allowed to alter its RT production level while constrained
by its fixed commitment and ramping limits. However, unlike
slow-start generators, a fast-start dispatchable generator can
change its commitment decisions in RT as well as its output.1
A wind power generator is a unit with zero marginal cost, and
usually has the ability to be curtailed. Renewable incentives
are not considered in this paper.
1It is possible to divide RT markets into separate real-time unit commitment
and dispatch-only RT markets, for example, as in the California market, but
this refinement is left for future research.
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As for other market players, we consider two types of
DR providers: slow and fast [33]-[35]. Slow DR providers,
e.g., an industrial plant, can only change their consumption
schedule in the DA market. However, fast DR providers, e.g.,
DR aggregators with HVAC controls, can be scheduled DA and
then redispatched at short notice for RT balancing purposes. It
is assumed that all DR providers can provide both upward and
downward DR services, i.e., they can either increase and/or
decrease their consumption levels to some extent.
Meanwhile, the ISO is, in essence, a spatial arbitrager or
trader who moves power around to maximize the value of the
transactions, while respecting the physical constraints of the
grid [36]. The final market party is consumers; for simplicity,
we assume all system loads to be deterministic and perfectly
inelastic with respect to price, so the only forecast errors occur
for wind power generators. A more general formulation to
include load uncertainty is a straightforward extension [36].
We now review some general assumptions about the market
players’ information, behavior, and costs.
First, we assume that if the ISO solves a deterministic model
to clear the DA market, it uses a single wind forecast (actually,
a single set of offers of MW production by wind plants)
and treats it as if it is a perfect prediction of actual wind
availability.2
Second, we make the simplifying assumption that in the
RT markets, the real-time conditions for the entire day, such
as hourly wind production, become known at the beginning
of the day, but after DA commitments are made. That is,
the actual wind realization for the full 24 hours becomes
known at midnight, and is selected from one of the set
of possible scenarios. More complex assumptions (such as
Markov decision process in real time [37]) are possible and
would result in more hedging in RT commitment and dispatch
decisions [38], but at the cost of a much more complex model.
Our simplifying assumption has been made by many other
wind integration models (e.g., [39]), and does not alter the
fundamental fact that DA scheduling is done under much more
forecast uncertainty than real-time operations. Wind scenario
generation and/or reduction techniques are outside the scope
of this paper.
Third, we assume that all market players act competitively.
That is, when bidding in an ISO-operated market, they offer
truthfully at quantities equal to their available capacities at
prices identical to their marginal costs. On the other hand, if
they self-schedule, we assume that they do so non-strategically,
by assuming that their decisions will not affect prices. In addi-
tion, all players are assumed to be expected-profit maximizers.
2This simplifies the reality of ISO DA market scheduling processes today.
These are actually the result of a complex interaction of deterministic MW
offers by wind generators in the DA financial markets, which result in
schedules of thermal generators that are subject to alteration by so-called
“residual unit commitment” (RUC) processes that instead are based on an
ISO wind forecast. RUC processes complement the financial market-clearing
process, and are intended to assure operators that enough physical resources
have been committed day ahead to meet plausible physical load and renewable
contingencies, irrespective of the load and resources (including offered wind)
that cleared in the financial market. The roles of deterministic wind offers and
ISO forecasts become even more complicated if some renewable resources are
scheduled in the financial market based on ISO forecasts (e.g., the CAISO’s
“Participating Intermittent Resource Program”).
Generalizations that allow for risk aversion (e.g., [14]) and
Nash-Cournot market power (e.g., [16]) are straightforward.
However, if the market requires submission of a single non-
decreasing DA offer curve for each unit that is to apply to all
hours, Cournot price-quantity equilibria might be inconsistent
with this requirement, and more complex supply function
equilibria models could be, in theory, more appropriate [40].
Fourth, the generation-side constraints in this work are
represented by a tight relaxed version of the UC problem
[41], as the resulting model is convex and therefore avoids
equilibrium existence problems that arise with UC models
with 0/1 binary variables. This particular relaxed model pro-
vides more accurate UC cost estimates than either using pure
dispatch models (that ignore 0/1 commitment decisions) or
simply relaxing the 0/1 binary restriction in standard UC
formulations. In particular, the feasible region of the UC
problem is tightened by including the relaxed commitment
variables within ramping constraints as shown below. We
include startup costs, Pmin restrictions and costs, and ramp
limits, but other UC constraints, such as minimum on- and
off-times [42], are omitted for simplicity. Intuitively, this
relaxation allows a continuous portion of a plant (or a set
of identical plants) to be committed at any given time, such
as 570 MW out of a 1000 MW unit. The minimum and
maximum outputs of the generator, as well as its ramp rate
limits, are proportional to the committed capacity. Startup
costs are incurred when the quantity of committed capacity
increases from interval to interval, and are proportional to
the amount of increase.3 We also exclude operating reserve
products from our problem since we do not address forced
outages of the physical assets here. However, a generalization
including reserves is easily derived, but would complicate our
analysis without significantly changing its conclusions.
III. THE FOUR TWO-SETTLEMENT MARKET MODELS
The following four DA-RT market-clearing models are
considered in this paper:
• Stoch-MP : Multi-player stochastic two-settlement equi-
librium model. This is a theoretical model, not imple-
mented in any market, in which the ISO supervises a
market-clearing process both DA and in RT between
parties who each determine on their own what quantities
they want to buy or sell (“self-schedule”) in each of
the markets in response to the DA and RT prices.
It is assumed that the ISO adjusts market prices and
the parties adjust their self-schedules to result in an
equilibrium situation in which no party can increase its
expected (probability-weighted) profit by adjusting the
amounts it sells in any market.
3Our numerical tests of this approximation [41] show that it is most accurate
when there are multiple generating units of a given type, so that the error
resulting from (for example) assuming that, say, 57% of capacity is on line
rather than forcing the solution to be either exactly, say, 5 or 6 out of 10
identical units is negligible. Thus, the approximation is better for larger
systems with many similar units than for smaller systems whose capacity
is dominated by a handful of large generators. Those tests also indicate that
the approximation yields much better estimates of total production costs, plant
capacity factors, and prices than does, for example, load duration curve-type
models that disregard unit commitment constraints entirely.
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Each DR provider (slow and fast)
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Fig. 2. The structure of multi-player stochastic two-settlement equilibrium
model (Stoch-MP )
• Stoch-Opt : Stochastic optimization model, which min-
imizes the total expected system cost (baseline). This is
also a theoretical model that has not been implemented
in actual markets, in which a central operator solves a
stochastic unit commitment problem day ahead to deter-
mine an optimal day-ahead energy schedule, followed by
real-time resolution of imbalances by the ISO. There are
no self-schedules.
• Seq : Sequential two-settlement equilibrium model. This
market model as well as the next one are simplified rep-
resentations of how US markets now operate, in which a
market operator schedules thermal generation in the DA
market considering only a single (deterministic) demand
and wind forecast, and virtual bidders are allowed to
buy in the DA market and sell back in the real-time
market. This is a simplification of how US markets
actually work, in which the ISO’s demand and wind
forecasts are used in DA “residual unit commitment”
markets to ensure that enough capacity is committed,
while demand bids and wind offers that can depend on
price are considered in the financial DA market.
• Seq-SS : Extended Seq with self-scheduling slow-start
generators. Like the previous model, this is a simplified
representation of today’s markets in the US. This model
also considers the ability of generators in these markets
to self-schedule in the DA market and then adjust output
in the RT market if they find that more profitable than
having the ISO schedule its output.
Note that Stoch-MP , Seq and Seq-SS are equilibrium mod-
els, while Stoch-Opt is an optimization problem, representing
the situation in which the ISO schedules all generation and
DR in both DA and RT using stochastic programming. Across
these four models, we consider identical wind forecasts and
error distributions. In each model, actual RT wind realizations
are assumed to follow a distribution defined by a set of
scenarios and probabilities; what market parties assume about
the wind distribution in the DA market depends on the model,
as explained below. However, we assume perfect VB in all four
models, i.e., the virtual bidders in DA have perfect knowledge
of the distribution of RT prices, and eliminate any arbitrage
profits. That is, they will buy or sell in the two markets
until the DA prices equal the expected RT prices. The market
models differ concerning the role of the ISO as well as which
parties consider the RT distribution of prices when determining
DA schedules, as explained next.
In Stoch-MP , the ISO only allocates scarce transmission
capacity, and does not schedule generation, unlike Stoch-Opt ,
Seq and Seq-SS . Each market player (generators, DR, and
virtual bidders) maximizes its expected profit across the DA
and RT markets considering them simultaneously, each solving
a stochastic profit maximization problem. For instance, a slow-
start thermal generator decides DA how much capacity to com-
mit, how much power to sell in the DA and each of RT market
(one per wind realization), and how much to generate in order
to fulfill those supply schedules. Fast-start thermal generators,
in contrast, do not need to make commitment decisions until
real time, but can also sell in either DA and/or the RT markets.
Wind power generators decide how much to sell DA and in
each of the RT markets, given its distribution of potential wind
production. Slow DR makes its commitment decisions DA
and sells in the DA market, while fast DR waits until real
time, but buys/sells power either DA or in RT, whichever is
most profitable, thus being able to arbitrage the two markets.4
The system operator performs a spatial arbitrage function,
being able to buy at one node and sell at another at the
same time while satisfying transmission constraints. Finally,
the temporal arbitrage function is assigned to virtual bidders.
Simultaneously solving these profit maximization problems for
all players while imposing market clearing forms a stochastic
equilibrium problem. The structure of this equilibrium model
is schematically depicted in Fig. 2. In this model, it is assumed
that each player has the same (and correct) beliefs concerning
the distribution of wind generation scenarios and the RT prices
that result in each. It can be intuitively expected that the VB
has no impact in Stoch-MP since not only virtual bidders,
but also all other players have the same knowledge in DA
concerning wind scenarios in RT, and can decide to schedule
their output or consumption in either market, thus acting as
arbitragers themselves.
In Stoch-Opt , a single optimization problem is solved, in
which the grid operator uses stochastic programming to co-
optimize all generation and DR in both DA and RT markets
to minimize the total expected system cost, and in addition
calculates DA and RT locational marginal prices (LMPs). The
structure of this model is schematically illustrated in Fig. 3.
Similar to Stoch-MP , DA and RT outcomes are determined
simultaneously, so the separate RT scheduling and pricing
problems are solved all at once. Independent virtual bidders
arbitrage the DA and RT markets in Stoch-Opt , so that the
DA and the expected RT prices are the same; however, by
performing stochastic optimization for DA and RT simulta-
neously, the ISO in a sense already performs the arbitrage
function, so the presence or absence of virtual bidders will
not affect the solution.
By design, Stoch-Opt obtains the fully efficient DA sched-
4An alternative formulation could allow the slow DR to also sell in the RT
market, but this would not change the basic market results.
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Minimize [system cost in DA] + [expected system cost in RT]
Subject to: 
 Production, ramping and start‐up limits of generators in DA and RT
 Generators’ binary UC variables relaxation
 Sum of virtual arbitrage quantities in DA and RT is zero
 Network limits in DA and RT
 DR quantity limits in DA and RT
 Power balances in DA and RT
Fig. 3. The structure of stochastic optimization model, which minimizes the
total expected system cost (Stoch-Opt)
ules and the least-possible expected system cost. We demon-
strate later that under mild convexity conditions, the solutions
of Stoch-MP and Stoch-Opt are the same, in the sense that
any solution of one model is also a solution to the other. This
implies that if all market parties independently optimize their
schedules, costs are convex, no one possesses market power,
and everyone has the same expectations about the distribution
of RT prices, then the stochastic equilibrium among market
parties who self-schedule against DA and RT prices results in
the minimum expected cost of meeting demand.
In Seq , unlike Stoch-MP and Stoch-Opt , a sequential
market clearing is simulated in which the ISO first clears
the DA market deterministically considering just the single
deterministic wind forecast. In the basic version of this model,
the operator schedules all generation and DR. Then, in real-
time, the ISO clears the RT market for each wind generation
scenario by scheduling deviations for any generators and DR
who are not self-scheduled. In the basic version of this model,
the virtual bidders are assumed to be the only players that
have perfect knowledge in DA concerning the full distribution
of RT prices resulting from the wind generation scenarios.
Therefore, each virtual bidder considers both DA and RT
markets simultaneously and maximizes its expected profit;
in equilibrium, this arbitrage will eliminate any difference
between DA prices and expected RT prices. In contrast, other
players such as generators are naive in the sense that they allow
the ISO to dispatch them in the DA based on the deterministic
wind forecast in that market, and then are recommitted and/or
redispatched by the ISO in the RT market based on actually
realized wind scenario in that market. Fig. 4 depicts the
structure of this model. Unlike Stoch-MP and Stoch-Opt , it
can be intuitively expected that the VB potentially impacts the
market-clearing outcomes in Seq . Accordingly, we solve Seq
with and without virtual bidders, and then compare the results
obtained, i.e., DA schedules and total system cost, with those
obtained from Stoch-MP and Stoch-Opt . As we will show,
without VB, the sequential solutions of Seq are likely to be
inefficient compared to the ideal (cost-minimizing) solutions
of Stoch-MP and Stoch-Opt , but VB can improve the per-
formance of Seq . In some (but not all) cases, VB eliminates
all the inefficiencies and yields the same DA commitments
as the stochastic solution, even though the ISO is solving a
deterministic market model in the DA market.
In Seq-SS , we consider an extension of Seq in which
selected slow-start generators are allowed to self-schedule
[43], under the assumption that they (like virtual bidders)
Minimize System cost in DA
By  choosing  commitment  and  production  levels  of  generators,  DR  schedules  and 
network flows in DA 
Subject to: 
 Production, ramping and start‐up limits of generators in DA 
 Generators’ binary UC variables relaxation
 Network limits in DA 
 DR quantity limits in DA 
 Power balances in DA 
DA market clearing
Minimize Probability‐weighted system cost in RT
By choosing production levels of generators, commitment of fast‐start generators, fast 
DR schedules and network flows in RT 
Subject to: 
 Production, ramping and start‐up limits of generators in RT 
 Fast‐start generators’ binary UC variables relaxation
 Network limits in RT 
 Fast DR quantity limits in RT 
 Power balances in RT 
RT market clearing for each wind scenario
Each virtual bidder
Maximize Expected profit
By choosing DA and RT arbitrage quantities
Subject to: 
 Sum of arbitrage quantities in DA and RT is zero.
Fig. 4. The structure of sequential two-settlement equilibrium model (Seq)
Minimize System cost in DA
By choosing commitment and production levels of generators (excluding self‐scheduling 
slow‐start generators), DR schedules and network flows in DA 
Subject to: 
 Production, ramping and start‐up limits of generators in DA 
 Generators’ binary UC variables relaxation
 Network limits in DA 
 DR quantity limits in DA 
 Power balances in DA 
DA market clearing
Minimize Probability‐weighted system cost in RT
By choosing production levels of generators, commitment of fast‐start generators, fast 
DR schedules and network flows in RT 
Subject to: 
 Production, ramping and start‐up limits of generators in RT 
 Fast‐start generators’ binary UC variables relaxation
 Network limits in RT 
 Fast DR quantity limits in RT 
 Power balances in RT 
RT market clearing for each wind scenario
Each virtual bidder
Maximize Expected profit
By choosing DA and RT arbitrage quantities
Subject to: 
 Sum of arbitrage quantities in DA and RT is zero.
Each self‐scheduling slow‐start generator 
Maximize Expected profit
By choosing commitment and production levels in DA and RT
Subject to: 
 Production, ramping and start‐up limits in DA and RT
 Binary UC variables relaxation
Fig. 5. The structure of extended Seq with self-scheduling slow-start
generators (Seq-SS )
correctly anticipate the RT distribution of prices. They op-
timize their schedules in the DA and RT markets based on
the DA and RT prices calculated by the ISO. Thus, this
model includes in a single equilibrium model: (i) deterministic
scheduling of all DR and some generators by the operator, as
in Seq ; (ii) independent self-scheduling by selected slow-start
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DA settlement 
(The set of wind scenarios and their 
probabilities are known in DA, but 
which one actually occurs in RT is 
unknown.)
...
RT operation
for each wind scenario
...
Fig. 6. The decision sequence in stochastic models (i.e., Stoch-MP and
Stoch-Opt)
generators (the so-called self-scheduling generators), based on
expected profit-maximizing, similar to Stoch-MP ; and (iii)
virtual bidders as in Stoch-MP , Stoch-Opt and Seq . The
structure of this model is illustrated in Fig. 5. The results
of Seq-SS (in the second of this two-part paper) show that
this extension tends to improve the solutions of Seq further, if
they are not already efficient. This model enables us to address
whether a deterministic DA market followed by RT markets
with VB and self-scheduling can result in fully efficient DA
schedules and least-possible system cost, as in Stoch-MP and
Stoch-Opt .
Among these four models, Stoch-Opt has the attractive
theoretical property of achieving the lowest expected operating
cost, under the assumption that the ISO can obtain the stochas-
tic information (e.g., probability distributions) required for
stochastic clearing. However, this assumption is incompatible
with the current practice of real-world electricity markets, and
its implementation would place a large burden on the ISO
to develop this information and to obtain stakeholder consent
for the procedures involved. In contrast, and in line with the
structure of current markets, the ISO sticks to deterministic
clearing in Seq and Seq-SS , while instead allowing the
virtual bidders and self-scheduling generators to adjust energy
schedules to deal with uncertainty.5
We now describe at what point of time each model is solved.
The decision sequence in stochastic models, i.e., Stoch-MP
and Stoch-Opt , is illustrated in Fig. 6. In these two ideal
models, the set of RT wind scenarios and their probabilities
are known at the DA stage. Therefore, the DA schedule as
well as the RT schedules by scenario are solved in one shot, so
that DA decisions are made fully recognizing what adaptations
5What our analysis indicates is that it is possible that a subset of market
parties acting based on high quality stochastic information, can achieve
the same efficiencies as central stochastic clearing by the ISO. Therefore,
despite the theoretical appeal of the latter approach, its practical difficulties
together with the efficiency of Seq-SS suggest that ISOs should not embrace
the central stochastic model, but should instead carefully evaluate whether
self-scheduling and VB in fact already allow markets to realize most of
the potential efficiencies of stochastic scheduling. Although there has been
previous works comparing deterministic and stochastic clearing mechanisms
[44]-[47], they have not modeled VB and self-scheduling; further theoretical
and empirical work is needed before a definite conclusion can be made about
whether stochastic information is best incorporated through central (Stoch-
MP ) or distributed (Seq-SS ) types of processes.
DA settlement 
(based on a 
deterministic wind 
forecast)
...
Actual wind 
power is 
realized
...DA outcomes are fixed
Sequential (DA‐RT) clearing by ISO: 
DA settlement 
(Distribution of RT 
prices across scenarios 
is known)
...
RT operation
for each scenario
...
Stochastic two‐stage decision making by each virtual bidder 
(and by each self‐scheduling generator in Seq‐SS):  
RT operation
for any potential 
wind realization
Fig. 7. The decision sequence in sequential models (i.e., Seq and Seq-SS )
might happen in real time. Meanwhile, the decision sequence
in sequential models, i.e., Seq and Seq-SS , is depicted in Fig.
7. Similar to the stochastic models, Seq and Seq-SS are solved
day ahead at once. The reason for this is that although the
ISO clears DA and RT markets sequentially (the upper box
in Fig. 7), the virtual bidders (and self-scheduling generators
in Seq-SS ) make their DA and RT decisions simultaneously,
recognizing their interdependency and the uncertainty in RT
(the lower box in Fig. 7). (This is because a decision to sell
X MW in the DA market irrevocably binds the virtual bidder
to buying back the same amount in RT.) When calculating
the overall market outcomes in these two models, however,
we consider the decision-making problems of the ISO, virtual
bidders and self-scheduling generators together, forming an
equilibrium model. This allows us to assess the value of
informed VB and self-scheduling. This equilibrium calculation
simulates the receipt by the ISO of the offers and bids of
virtual bidders and self-scheduled generators, and then the
sequential clearing of the DA and RT markets at different
points of time.
It is worth mentioning that we consider the same distribution
of uncertain wind production in all four models since each
of them are solved at once at the DA stage, assuming the
same closing time and thus wind information availability at
that stage. All models assume that there is no uncertainty in
real time.
The mathematical formulation of Stoch-MP is provided
next. The other three models are described in the companion
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paper [48], based on the assumptions described above along
with several of the individual market party problems given
below.
A. Stoch-MP : Multi-Player Stochastic Two-Settlement Equi-
librium Model
As illustrated in Fig. 2, several profit-maximization prob-
lems are considered in Stoch-MP , one per player. These
problems are defined in this subsection by (1). Note that
dual variables are listed alongside each constraint. First, the
profit-maximization problem for each slow-start dispatchable
generator i ∈ S is given by (1a) below.
{
Maximize
uDAi,t ,c
DA
i,t ,p
DA
i,t ,p
RT
i,t,s∑
t
[
pDAi,t
(
λDA(n:i∈Ψn),t − Ci
)
− cDAi,t
]
+
∑
t,s
φs
[
pRTi,t,s
(
λRT(n:i∈Ψn),t,s
φs
− Ci
)]
(1aa)
subject to:
uDAi,t P i ≤ pDAi,t ≤ uDAi,t P i : µi,t, µi,t ∀t (1ab)
uDAi,t P i ≤
(
pDAi,t + p
RT
i,t,s
) ≤ uDAi,t P i : ρi,t,s, ρi,t,s
∀t, s (1ac)
− uDAi,(t−1) RDi ≤
(
pDAi,t − pDAi,(t−1)
)
≤ uDAi RUi : µDi,t, µUi,t
∀t (1ad)
− uDAi,(t−1) RDi ≤
(
pDAi,t + p
RT
i,t,s − pDAi,(t−1) − pRTi,(t−1),s
)
≤ uDAi,t RUi : ρDi,t,s, ρUi,t,s ∀t, s (1ae)
cDAi,t ≥ CSUi
(
uDAi,t − uDAi,(t−1)
)
: µSUi,t ∀t (1af)
uDAi,t ≤ 1 : µrlxi,t ∀t (1ag)
uDAi,t ≥ 0; cDAi,t ≥ 0 ∀t
}
∀i ∈ S. (1ah)
Objective function (1aa) maximizes the expected profit of
slow-start generator i ∈ S in the DA and RT markets. Note
that
λRTn,t,s
φs
refers to the probability-adjusted real-time LMP
at node n, hour t under scenario s. Constraints (1ab) and
(1ac) bound the production levels in DA and RT markets,
respectively. Constraints (1ad) and (1ae) enforce the ramp
rate limits of slow-start generator in DA and RT markets,
respectively. Finally, constraints (1af)-(1ah) calculate the start-
up cost of generator i ∈ S and relax its corresponding
commitment variables in the DA market.
According to (1a), a slow-start generator makes all commit-
ment decisions in the DA market, with the chosen commitment
schedule being imposed in all RT scenarios. It is assumed
that DA and RT schedules must both be feasible relative
to generation capacity and ramping constraints. However, an
alternative formulation can omit the DA constraints (1ab) and
(1ad), in which case the DA schedule is purely financial, and
the generator can act as an unrestrained financial arbitrager
between the DA and RT markets. In the presence of separate
virtual players, as in this model, this omission would not affect
the equilibrium prices, unit commitment, or total (DA plus RT)
dispatch of generators or DR.
The profit-maximization problem for each fast-start dis-
patchable generator i ∈ F is given by (1b) below:{
Maximize
uDAi,t ,c
DA
i,t ,p
DA
i,t ,u
RT
i,t,s,c
RT
i,t,s,p
RT
i,t,s∑
t
[
pDAi,t
(
λDA(n:i∈Ψn),t − Ci
)
− cDAi,t
]
+
∑
t,s
φs
[
pRTi,t,s
(
λRT(n:i∈Ψn),t,s
φs
− Ci
)
− cRTi,t,s
]
(1ba)
subject to:
(1ab), (1ad), (1af)− (1ah) (1bb)(
uDAi,t + u
RT
i,t,s
)
P i ≤
(
pDAi,t + p
RT
i,t,s
)
≤ (uDAi,t + uRTi,t,s)P i : ρi,t,s, ρi,t,s ∀t, s (1bc)
−
(
uDAi,(t−1) + u
RT
i,(t−1),s
)
RDi ≤(
pDAi,t + p
RT
i,t,s − pDAi,(t−1) − pRTi,(t−1),s
)
≤(
uDAi,t + u
RT
i,t,s
)
RUi : ρ
D
i,t,s, ρ
U
i,t,s ∀t, s (1bd)
cDAi,t + c
RT
i,t,s ≥ CSUi
(
uDAi,t + u
RT
i,t,s − uDAi,(t−1) − uRTi,(t−1),s
)
: ρSUi,t,s ∀t, s (1be)
cDAi,t + c
RT
i,t,s ≥ 0 : ρci,t,s ∀t, s (1bf)
uDAi,t + u
RT
i,t,s ≤ 1 : ρrlxi,t,s ∀t, s (1bg)
uRTi,t,s ≥ 0 ∀t, s
}
∀i ∈ F . (1bh)
Unlike the slow-start generators, the commitment status of
each fast-start generator can be adjusted in the RT market.
Objective function (1ba) maximizes the expected profit of fast-
start generator i ∈ F in DA and RT markets. The generation
constraints of fast-start generator in the DA market are en-
forced by (1bb), while (1bc)-(1bh) represent the analogous
constraints in the RT market. Note that uRTi,t,s in (1bg) is
appropriately viewed as the incremental commitment in RT
relative to the DA commitment.
The profit-maximization problem for each wind power
generator i ∈ W is given by (1c) below:{
Maximize
pDAi,t ,p
RT
i,t,s
∑
t
[
pDAi,t λ
DA
(n:i∈Ψn),t
+
∑
s
φs p
RT
i,t,s
λRT(n:i∈Ψn),t,s
φs
]
(1ca)
subject to:
pDAi,t ≤WDAi,t : µi,t ∀t (1cb)
0 ≤ (pDAi,t + pRTi,t,s) ≤WRTi,t,s : ρi,t,s, ρi,t,s ∀t, s (1cc)
pDAi,t ≥ 0 ∀t
}
∀i ∈ W. (1cd)
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Objective function (1ca) maximizes the expected profit of wind
generator i ∈ W in the DA and RT markets. In addition,
constraints (1cb)-(1cd) enforce its production limits in DA and
RT markets. Note that constraint (1cc) implicitly allows the
excessive wind power to be spilled. Note also that the upper
bound of (1cc), i.e., stochastic parameter WRTi,t,s, represents the
scenarios of potential RT wind power output.
The profit-maximization problem for each slow DR provider
d ∈ SDR is given by (1d) below:{
Maximize
dDA↓d,k,t,d
DA↑
d,k,t
∑
k,t
[
dDA↓d,k,t
(
λDA(n:d∈Ψn),t − C↓d,k,t
)
+ dDA↑d,k,t
(
C↑d,k,t − λDA(n:d∈Ψn),t
)]
(1da)
subject to:
dDA↓d,k,t ≤ D↓d,k,t : µ↓d,k,t ∀k, t (1db)
dDA↑d,k,t ≤ D↑d,k,t : µ↑d,k,t ∀k, t (1dc)
dDA↓d,k,t ≥ 0; dDA↑d,k,t ≥ 0 ∀k, t
}
∀d ∈ SDR. (1dd)
Objective function (1da) maximizes the profit of slow DR
provider d ∈ SDR in the DA market. Note that this DR re-
source does not provide balancing services in RT. Constraints
(1db)-(1dd) bind its downward and upward DR quantities.
The profit-maximization problem for each fast DR provider
d ∈ FDR is given by (1e) below:{
Maximize
dDA↓d,k,t,d
DA↑
d,k,t,d
RT↓
d,k,t,s,d
RT↑
d,k,t,s∑
k,t
[
dDA↓d,k,t
(
λDA(n:d∈Ψn),t − C↓d,k,t
)
+ dDA↑d,k,t
(
C↑d,k,t − λDA(n:d∈Ψn),t
)]
+
∑
k,t,s
φs
[
dRT↓d,k,t,s
(
λRT(n:d∈Ψn),t,s
φs
− C↓d,k,t
)
+ dRT↑d,k,t,s
(
C↑d,k,t −
λRT(n:d∈Ψn),t,s
φs
)]
(1ea)
subject to:
(1db)− (1dd) (1eb)
0 ≤
(
dDA↓d,k,t + d
RT↓
d,k,t,s
)
≤ D↓d,k,t : ρ↓d,k,t,s, ρ
↓
d,k,t,s
∀k, t, s (1ec)
0 ≤
(
dDA↑d,k,t + d
RT↑
d,k,t,s
)
≤ D↑d,k,t : ρ↑d,k,t,s, ρ
↑
d,k,t,s
∀k, t, s
}
∀d ∈ FDR. (1ed)
Objective function (1ea) maximizes the expected profit of fast
DR provider d ∈ FDR in the DA and RT markets. Note
that unlike the slow DR providers, each fast DR provider can
participate in both DA and RT markets. Constraints (1eb) bind
its upward and downward DR quantities in the DA market,
while similar constraints in the RT market are enforced by
(1ec) and (1ed).
The profit-maximization problem for each virtual bidder f
is given by (1f) below:
{
Maximize
vDAf,t ,v
RT
f,t
∑
t
[
vDAf,t λ
DA
(n:f∈Ψn),t
+
∑
s
φs v
RT
f,t
λRT(n:f∈Ψn),t,s
φs
]
(1fa)
subject to: vDAf,t + v
RT
f,t = 0 : ρf,t ∀t
}
∀f. (1fb)
Objective function (1fa) maximizes the expected profit of
virtual bidder f participating in the DA and RT markets. Note
that the trading quantities in DA and RT markets, i.e., vDAf,t
and vRTf,t , are both scenario-independent since virtual bidders
own no physical assets and so are obliged to zero out their
financial position. In other words, as constrained by (1fb),
each virtual bidder buys/sells a quantity in the DA market and
then sells/buys back that quantity in the RT market. Note also
that (1f) implicitly imposes the equality of DA and expected
RT prices at bus n within the equilibrium problem. It is
straightforward to yield this price equality condition through
the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of (1f).
The profit-maximization problem for the ISO is given by
(1g). Note that the following formulation is based on the B−θ
formulation of the linearized DC load flow, and is equivalent
to the power transfer distribution factor (PTDF)-based grid
operator problem in [36]:
Maximize
aDAn,m,t,θ
DA
n,t ,a
RT
n,m,t,s,θ
RT
n,t,s∑
n,m∈Ωn,t
[
aDAm,n,t λ
DA
n,t +
∑
s
φs
(
aRTm,n,t,s − aDAm,n,t
) λRTn,t,s
φs
]
(1ga)
subject to:
aDAn,m,t = Bn,m
(
θDAn,t − θDAm,t
)
: µn,m,t ∀n,m ∈ Ωn, t
(1gb)
aRTn,m,t,s = Bn,m
(
θRTn,t,s − θRTm,t,s
)
: ρn,m,t,s
∀n,m ∈ Ωn, t, s (1gc)
aDAn,m,t ≤ Fn,m : µflown,m,t ∀n,m ∈ Ωn, t (1gd)
aRTn,m,t,s ≤ Fn,m : ρflown,m,t,s ∀n,m ∈ Ωn, t, s (1ge)
θDA(n=1),t = 0 : µ
1
t ∀t (1gf)
θRT(n=1),t,s = 0 : ρ
1
t,s ∀t, s. (1gg)
Objective function (1ga) maximizes the expected profit that
the ISO gains by transferring energy throughout the network
in DA and RT markets. Constraints (1gb) and (1gc) define
the power flow across each transmission line in DA and RT
markets, respectively. Constraints (1gd) and (1ge) enforce the
line limits in the two markets. Finally, constraints (1gf) and
(1gg) introduce node n = 1 as the voltage angle reference
node. Note that the physical load flow and flow capacity
constraints are enforced in both DA and RT markets, although
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for each slow‐start generator  
Profit‐maximization problem (1b) 
for each fast‐start generator  
Profit‐maximization problem (1c) 
for each wind power generator  
Profit‐maximization problem (1d) 
for each slow DR provider  
Profit‐maximization problem (1e) 
for each fast DR provider  
Profit‐maximization problem (1f) 
for each virtual bidder  
Profit‐maximization problem (1g) 
for the grid operator  
Shared constraints (1h) 
for market clearing  
KKT conditions of (1a)   
KKT conditions of (1b)
KKT conditions of (1c)
KKT conditions of (1d)
KKT conditions of (1e)
KKT conditions of (1f)
KKT conditions of (1g)
Shared constraints (1h) 
for market clearing  
Equilibrium model Stoch‐MP A MLCP that is equivalent to Stoch‐MP
Fig. 8. Model Stoch-MP recast as a mixed linear complementarity problem
(MLCP).
the DA constraints could be omitted without changing the
equilibrium profits and prices.
Finally, the market-clearing constraints in the DA and RT
markets are respectively given by (1ha) and (1hb) below:
∑
d∈Ψn,k
(
Ld,t + d
DA↑
d,k,t − dDA↓d,k,t
)
+
∑
m∈Ωn
aDAn,m,t −
∑
i∈Ψn
pDAi,t
−
∑
f∈Ψn
vDAf,t = 0 : λ
DA
n,t ∀n, t (1ha)
∑
d∈Ψn,k
(
dRT↑d,k,t,s − dRT↓d,k,t,s
)
+
∑
m∈Ωn
(
aRTn,m,t,s − aDAn,m,t
)
−
∑
i∈Ψn
pRTi,t,s −
∑
f∈Ψn
vRTf,t = 0 : λ
RT
n,t,s ∀n, t, s. (1hb)
The DA balancing constraint (1ha) implies that at each node
and in each hour, the load based on DR schedules is equal to
dispatchable and wind generation plus injection of arbitragers
into the grid and net power inflows from other nodes. The
RT production forecast errors are accommodated in (1hb) by
generator redispatch, fast generator commitment, and fast DR
schedules. Note that the dual variables of (1ha) and (1hb)
provide day-ahead and probability-weighted real-time LMPs,
respectively.
The solution of Stoch-MP , i.e., the multi-player stochastic
two-settlement Nash-Bertrand equilibrium point, can be ob-
tained by simultaneously solving the KKT conditions of all
players together with market clearing [36], as illustrated in
Fig. 8. The resulting model is a mixed linear complementarity
problem (MLCP) that can be solved using PATH or other
complementarity problem solvers. This is a Nash-Bertrand
equilibrium because each player believes it cannot affect prices
by its actions; this model could be generalized to a closed
loop Nash-Cournot model if some or all players recognize
how quantities supplied/purchased affect prices through the
demand function. The equilibrium conditions of Stoch-MP
(i.e., the KKT and market-clearing conditions) are described
in Appendix of [48]. A general introduction to equilibrium
and complementarity models can be found in [49].
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In the first part of this two-paper series, four different
models for clearing the two-settlement markets (day-ahead
and real-time) are proposed. These include (i) a multi-player
stochastic equilibrium in which all players have the same
beliefs about the distribution of RT prices, (ii) co-optimization
of all schedules by the ISO using stochastic UC, (iii) a
sequential equilibrium in which the operator first selects DA
schedules considering a deterministic wind forecast, and then
rebalances the market in RT against the actual wind realization,
and (iv) an extension of the sequential equilibrium with some
self-scheduling slow-start generators. The assumptions of each
are summarized, and the players’ individual profit maximizing
models that make up the first model are presented.
These four models provide a framework to quantify the
economic value of flexible resources. In addition, the models
can address whether grid operators must use stochastic UC
models to achieve the optimal solution, or whether virtual
bidders along with some self-scheduling generators could
obtain it. The companion paper [48] provides the formulation
of Stoch-Opt , Seq and Seq-SS as well as results from a
simple illustrative example and a large-scale case study that
quantify the economic value of different types of flexible
resources. The applications also confirm that, indeed, the errors
of deterministic DA scheduling can be corrected by virtual
bidders and a few self-scheduled generators.
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